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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

JAMES M. LUNNEN,
Petitioner,

Case No. 93-0737 CA

vs.

i 5 CSRB 46 (Step 6)
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, and the CAREER ;| 11 CSRB/H.O. 154 (Step 5)
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE
]
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondents.

1 Priority 14.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

APPEAL FROM THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE CAREER
SERVICE REVIEW BOARD, AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, CASE NUMBER 11 CSRB/H.O. 154 (Step 5), 5
CSRB 46 (Step 6).

I.
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Utah Code Annotated 63-46b-16(l) (1953, as amended) confers
1

jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court or other appellate Courts, as
provided by statute, to review all final agency actions resulting
from formal adjudicative proceedings.

Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-

3(2)(a) (1953, as amended) and Rule 14(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure grant jurisdiction to the Utah Court of
Appeals to review the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of State agencies.

This appeal

is from a formal adjudicative proceeding conducted by the Career
Service Review Board (herein CSRB), a statutorily created and
state funded administrative agency.
II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues presented on appeal are as follows:
1.

Did the CSRB err in shifting the burden of proof from

the Utah Department of Transportation (herein UDOT) to
Petitioner?
Standard of Review:

This issue is one of interpreting the CSRB's

enabling statutes and rules and is to be analyzed on the
intermediate standard with the CSRB's ruling to be assessed for
its reasonableness and rationality.

Kent v. Dept. of Employment

Sec.. 860 P.2d 984, 986 (Ut. App. 1993).
2.

Did the Step 5 Hearing Officer have authority to, sua

sponte, re-open the evidentiary record after the same had been
2

closed?
Standard of Review;

This issue is one of interpreting the CSRB's

enabling statutes and rules and is to be analyzed on the
intermediate standard with the CSRB's ruling to be assessed for
its reasonableness and rationality.
3.

Id..

Did the CSRB err in determining there was substantial

evidence in the record to support the disciplinary sanctions
imposed by UDOT?
Standard of Review;

This issue is one of interpreting the CSRB's

enabling statutes and rules and is to be analyzed on the
intermediate standard with the CSRB's ruling to be assessed for
its reasonableness and rationality.

Id..

III.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are applicable to the case
on appeal and each of the following are set forth verbatim in the
Addendum hereto (pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of
Appellant Procedure);
a.

Utah Code Annotated 63-2-101 (1953, as amended).

b.

Utah Code Annotated 63-2-304(8) (1953, as amended).

c.

Utah Code Annotated 63-46b-16(l) (1953, as amended).

d.

Utah Code Annotated 67-18-1 (1953, as amended).
3

e.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19 -2(6) (1953, as amended).

f.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19 -15(2)(a) (1953, as amended).

g-

Utah Code Annotated 67-19 -15(2)(b) (1953, as amended).

h.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19 -18(1) (1953, as amended).

i.

Utah Code Annotated 67-19 a-406(2)(a) (1953, as amended).

j-

Utah Administrative Code R137-1-20C.

k.

Utah Administrative Code R137-1-20E.

1.

Utah Administrative Code R137-1-20G.

m.

Utah Administrative Code R137-1-20J.

n.

Utah Administrative Code R137-1-20L.

o.

Utah Administrative Code R477-11-1.

P-

Utah Administrative Code R477-ll-l(l)(a-e).
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. CASE NATURE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
AND DISPOSITION

This case arises from a grievance proceeding resulting from
disciplinary proceedings initiated by UDOT against Petitioner
Lunnen (herein Lunnen).

On August 10, 1992, UDOT's Executive

Director imposed a two grade demotion (from Grade 19 to Grade 17)
upon Lunnen and reduced Lunnen's pay by 2,75%.

Lunnen timely

appealed this disciplinary measure to the Step 5 level of the

4

grievance and appeal procedure for State career service
employees.
On November 10, 1992, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was held
before a duly appointed hearing officer, Michael N. Martinez.
The parties stipulated to a substantial number of facts and
thereafter each of the parties presented testimony and exhibits.
The record was then closed.

On January 5, 1993, Mr. Martinez

issued an Interim Order With Continuing Jurisdiction in which he
determined that Lunnen was insubordinate but that UDOT had not
carried its burden of proving that a demotion was a consistent
discipline for one act of insubordination.

Mr. Martinez, sua

sponte, re-opened the record for the purpose of receiving
additional documentation from UDOT.
On or about January 13, 1993, Lunnen's grievance
representative filed a Motion for Reconsideration requesting
UDOT's case be dismissed for failure to carry its burden of
proof.

On January 25, 1993, UDOT submitted a pleading entitled

"Response to Order" in which UDOT supplied other instances of
discipline it believed to be pertinent to the case. On February
3, 1993, Lunnen's grievance representative filed a reply to
UDOT's "Response" in which he asserted UDOT's evidence was
inadmissible under the residuum rule and the Hearing Officer
erred in re-opening the record.
5

On March 15, 1993, Mr. Martinez issued his Final Order, in
which he ratified UDOT's demotion of Lunnen and denied Lunnen's
Motion for Reconsideration.

Lunnen appealed to the CSRB.

The CSRB heard oral argument on August 12, 1993, and issued
its Decision and Final Agency Action on October 27, 1993. The
CSRB affirmed UDOTfs demotion, but on grounds different than Mr.
Martinez.

The CSRB determined there was substantial evidence in

the record before Mr. Martinez' re-opening thereof, such that the
demotion was appropriate.

The CSRB also determined Lunnen, not

UDOT, had the burden of proving inconsistent application of
disciplinary sanctions which, in effect, over-ruled Mr. Martinez.
Lastly, the CSRB ruled Mr. Martinez had authority to re-open the
record.
Lunnen appeals to this Court from the decisions of the Step
5 Hearing Officer and the CSRB.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

All citations are to the Findings of Fact (F.F.) rendered by
the Hearing Officer.

Copies of those Decisions are set forth in

the Addendum.
Petitioner James M. Lunnen (herein Lunnen) has been employed
with the Utah Department of Transportation (herein UDOT) since
1978. F.F. 1.

Lunnen was first promoted to a Grade 17, Highway

Operations Specialist in 1985. F.F. 2.
6

Subsequently, he was

promoted to a Grade 19, Highway Operations Specialist, in 1989.
F.F. 3. As a Highway Operations Specialist, Lunnen is subject to
being on 24 hour call-out for emergencies.

F.F. 4.

On June 12f

1992f Lunnen failed to respond to a call-out and was demoted
because of his failure to respond.

F.F. 28. But for the call-

out difficulties, Lunnen was a satisfactory employee and, in
fact, received an overall successful performance evaluation for
the period during which he was insubordinate. F.F. 29. See,
also, Joint Exhibit 3.
V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I;

The Utah State Personnel Management Act and State

Personnel Management rules are legal limitations on the
discretion state agencies have to discipline employees.

State

Personnel rules require disciplinary sanctions to be applied in a
consistent manner to all career service employees. The
Legislature has placed the burden of proof in all disciplinary
cases upon the state agency.

When read together, the State

Personnel rules and the statutory burden of proof place the
burden of proving "consistent application" on state agencies.
The CSRB erred in holding this burden was on Lunnen and the Court
should place the burden of consistent application on UDOT.
Several reasons suggest this conclusion.
7

First, placing the

burden on the agency is consistent with State Personnel rules and
the statutory burden of proof.

Second, the CSRB administrative

rules require a Hearing Officer to determine if the penalty is
excessive, to include whether it is consistent.

Third, the

concepts of fairness and due process embodied in the Utah State
Personnel Management Act (herein USPMA) and Division of Human
Resource Management rules are consistent with placing the burden
on the agency.

And finally, employees are prohibited from

obtaining documents to meet the burden by Government Records
Access and Management Act.

The burden is less onerous on the

agency and should therefore be placed upon it.
POINT II: The CSRB has only that authority granted to it by
statute.

When the CSRB exceeds its own administrative rules, it

abuses its discretion.

The CSRB's rules mandate the closing of

the record at the end of the evidentiary hearing.

In light of a

Hearing Officer determining that the CSRB has no authority to reopen the record and UDOT's counsel's implicit agreement with
Lunnen's position, the CSRB erred in granting the Hearing Officer
discretion to re-open the record.
POINT III; The CSRB made its determination of substantial
evidence regarding the disciplinary sanction on evidence that the
Hearing Officer did not find substantial or credible.

The CSRB

also ignored Lunnen's successful performance evaluations covering
8

the time period in which he was demoted.

The CSRB further

ignored the argument of UDOT's representative that he believed
demotion was appropriate because of the insubordination issue not performance.

The CSRB's reliance on performance issues and

non-credible testimony does not constitute substantial evidence
to support the disciplinary sanction.
VI.
ARGUMENT
I.
UDOT HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT LUNNEN'S
DEMOTION WAS A DISCIPLINARY SANCTION
CONSISTENT WITH OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED
EMPLOYEES.
Lunnen is a long-term career service employee of UDOT,
having been employed there since 1978. As a career service
employee, Lunnen is classified as a schedule B employee under the
Utah State Personnel Management Act (herein the USPMA).
U.C.A. 67-19-15(2)(b)(1953, as amended).

See,

Schedule B employees,

unlike schedule A exempt employees, can only be disciplined to
"advance the good of the public interest" and "for just cause."
Compare U.C.A. 67-19-15-(2)(a)(1953, as amended) (schedule A
employees serve "at the pleasure of the appointing officers
without regard to tenure") with U.C.A. 67-19-18(1)(1953, as
amended) (career service employees can only dismissed or demoted
for just cause).
9

Further, this Court has previously recognized that Section
18 of the USPMA imposes legal limitations on the discretion an
agency has to demote career service employees.

See, Kent v.

Dent, of Employment S e c , 860 P.2d 984, 987 (Utah App. 1993).
The Kent decision also recognizes that the administrative rules
promulgated by the Executive Director of the Department of Human
Resource Management (i.e., State Personnel —

herein DHRM)

constitute additional legal limitations on the discretion state
agencies may exercise in disciplining career service employees.
Finally, the Legislature has statutorily imposed upon state
agencies the burden of proof in all cases involving discipline of
career service employees:
"The agency has the burden of proof in all
grievances resulting from dismissals,
demotions, suspensions, written reprimands,
reductions in force, and disputes concerning
abandonment of position." U.C.A. 67-19a406(2)(a) (Emphasis supplied).
In light of the foregoing statutory mandates, Lunnen
maintains that UDOT cannot demote him if UDOT violated the USPMA.
Nor can UDOT demote Lunnen if it violated DHRM rules. Lastly,
Lunnen asserts that UDOT cannot demote him if it failed to carry
its statutory burden of proof.

Importantly, the case at bar

involves a demotion and is the first case this Court has had on a
disciplinary issue that did not involve termination from
employment.
10

In order to assess the case before the Courtf Lunnen asserts
the Court must first examine the elements of a disciplinary
action brought by a state agency against a career service
employee.

DHRM Rule 477-11-1 specifies that career service

employees may be disciplined for willful misconductf to include
insubordination.

Rule 477-11-1(1) also mandates the factors that

shall be considered by an agency when determining the type and
severity of the discipline to be imposed, to-wit:
"The type and severity of any disciplinary
action taken shall be governed by principles
of due process which include;
(a) Consistent application
(b) Prior knowledge of rules and standards
(c) Determination of fact
(d) Timely notice of noncompliance
(e) Opportunity to respond and rebut as
defined herein." R477-ll-l(1), Utah Admin.
Code (1993) (Emphasis supplied).
Based on R477-ll-l(l) and UDOT's statutory burden of proof
requirement set forth in U.C.A. 67-19a-406(2)(a) hereinabove,
Lunnen contends that UDOT had the burden of proving two (2)
elements in order to have properly exercised its discretion:
1) misconduct on the part of the employee;
and,
2) the disciplinary sanction shall be
consistent with other discipline imposed for
like misconduct.
In this case, Lunnen concedes that UDOT has carried its
burden of proving misconduct.

Lunnen believes, however, that

UDOT wholly failed to prove the second element of its case —
11

namely, that UDOT has demoted other career service employees for
similar misconduct.

An examination of the Step 5 Hearing

Officer's (herein the Hearing Officer) decisions and the CSRB's
analysis is therefore appropriate.
The Hearing Officer's initial determination was styled
"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Interim Order with
Continuing Jurisdiction" (herein the Hearing Officer's Interim
Order —

a copy is set forth in the Addendum).

In the Hearing

Officer's Interim Order, he acknowledged that UDOT had not
carried it burden of proof:
"Pursuant to U.C.A. 67-19a-406, the Agency
has the burden of proof in cases of demotion.
The Agency has not provided any proof that
the demotion of Lunnen is consistent with
prior discipline for one action of
insubordination...." Hearing Officer's
Interim Order at page 8.
After receipt of the Hearing Officer's Interim Order,
Lunnen's representative filed a Motion for Reconsideration
asserting UDOT had failed to carry its burden of proof and no
discipline should be imposed.

In a subsequent decision styled

"Final Order and Decision to Step 5 Proceedings" (herein Final
Step 5 Decision —

a copy is set forth in the Addendum), the

Hearing Officer again acknowledged that UDOT had not carried its
burden of proof but asserted (incorrectly we believe) that
further evidence on the issue of disciplinary sanctions was

12

necessary:
"Mr. Lunnen argues in his Motion for
Reconsideration that the Agency did not prove
a demotion was consistent discipline for one
act of insubordination. That is true.
However, this does not invalidate the finding
that Lunnen was, without doubt and by
substantial proof, insubordinate and the only
evidence received was that the reduction in
grade was what the Agency thought was just
and consistent with prior discipline.
Therefore, it was for Lunnen's benefit that
further proof of consistency was
required...." Step 5 Final Decision at page
3.
Significantly, the Hearing Officer, as finder of fact, was
never persuaded by the meager evidence presented by UDOT at the
evidentiary hearing.

To the contrary, the Hearing Officer

determined the glib testimony of Gene Sturzenegger did not meet
UDOT's burden of proof as shown in the preceding quotation.

In

fact, the Hearing Officer's assessment of Mr. Sturzenegger's
testimony as reflecting the Agency's "thoughts" was a
determination that his testimony was neither compelling testimony
nor substantial evidence.

The Hearing Officer simply did not

believe Mr. Sturzenegger's testimony was of sufficient precision
or persuasion to warrant reliance thereon as substantial
evidence.

Despite determining that UDOT had not carried its

burden of proof, the Hearing Officer did not dismiss UDOT's case
but sought additional evidence from UDOT after the record had
been closed.

Based on the additional evidence, the Hearing
13

Officer affirmed the demotion.

The appropriateness of the

Hearing Officer's sua sponte re-opening of the record is
discussed at Point II hereinbelow.
Lunnen thereafter appealed to the CSRB and asserted, as one
of his grounds on appeal, that the Hearing Officer had erred by
not dismissing UDOT's case against Lunnen after determining UDOT
had failed to meet its burden of proof.

The CSRB, sub silentio,

overruled the Hearing Officer's analysis regarding the burden of
proof and determined that Lunnen had the burden of proving UDOT's
disciplinary sanction was a consistent application of
disciplinary policies:
"The Department had the burden of proof when
the Step 5 proceedings commenced (67-19a406(2)(a)). UDOT had the initial burden to
show that its discipline was supported by
just cause. Once the agency has shown that
its disciplinary sanction was reasonable and
correct in relation to the facts and
circumstances, then the burden is on the
employee to show that the penalty imposed was
disproportionate or otherwise constituted an
abuse of discretion (R137-1-20C.2.).
Certainly inconsistency of treatment between
similarly situated employees could be a
showing of disproportion, which could
constitute an abuse of discretion. An abuse
of discretion results when a sanction is so
unreasonable that it offends reasonable
minds." Final Agency Decision at page 15.
The CSRB's analysis cannot stand for several reasons.
First, the Kent decision clearly mandates that the provisions of
R477-ll-l(l) constitute a limitation on the discretion of UDOT to
14

demote career service employees.

One of the mandatory

limitations in R477-ll-l(l) is "consistent application" of
discipline.

Further, R477-ll-l(l) is not only a mandatory factor

to be considered in disciplinary cases but is also a factor
grounded in constitutional concepts of "due process."

The CSRB's

analysis thus completely ignores the constitutional obligation
imposed upon UDOT by R477-ll-l(l) to consistently apply
discipline to all of its career service employees.
Second, the CSRB's analysis ignores the procedure it has
adopted, by administrative rule, in deciding disciplinary cases.
Specifically, R137-1-20C specifies a two (2)-pronged inquiry —
1) whether the facts support the allegations of misconduct and 2)
whether the Agency's disciplinary sanction is excessive or
disproportionate, to-wit:
"(1). The CSRB hearing officer shall first
make factual findings based solely on the
evidence presented at the hearing without
deference to any prior factual findings of
the agency. The CSRB hearing officer shall
then determine whether: (a) the factual
findings made from the evidentiary/Step 5
hearing support with substantial evidence the
allegations made by the agency or the
appointing authority, and (b) the agency has
correctly applied relevant policies, rules,
and statutes.
(2). When the CSRB hearing officer
determines in accordance with the procedures
set forth above that the evidentiary/Step 5
factual findings support the allegations of
the agency or the appointing authority, then
15

the CSRB hearing officer must determine
whether the agency's decision, including any
disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive,
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an
abuse of discretion. In making this latter
determinationf the CSRB hearing officer shall
give deference to the decision of the agency
or the appointing authority unless the
agency's penalty is determined to be
excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an
abuse of discretion in which instance the
CSRB hearing officer shall determine the
appropriate remedy." (Emphasis supplied).
Significantly, the CSRB's Step 6 Final Decision acknowledges
that inconsistent application of disciplinary sanctions would
violate its rules as found in R137-1-20C because an inconsistent
discipline would constitute an abuse of discretion.

See, Step 6

Final Decision at page 15. Thus, while the CSRB admits that
inconsistent discipline would violate DHRM rules and its own
rules, the CSRB persisted in its position that Lunnen had the
burden of proof on the issue of consistency, despite the Hearing
Officer being required (by CSRB rule) to affirmatively make a
determination on the issue of consistency.

Such an analysis is

illogical and should not be adopted by this Court.
Third, by overruling the CSRB and imposing the burden of
proving consistent application on UDOT, this Court would be
acting in a manner that confoanns with the USPMA and due process
principles.

The USPMA reflects the public policy of this state

that career service employees should receive "fair treatment."
16

U.C.A. 67-19-2(6)(1953, as amended).

Further, the "consistent

application" factor found in R477-ll-l(l) is predicated on due
process principles inasmuch as the rule specifically designates
the factors as being predicated on due process.

Simply stated,

UDOT has the burden to use due process when taking disciplinary
action against tenured employees.

Seef Cleveland Bd. of

Education v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).

Shifting the

burden of proof to Lunnen is therefore inconsistent with the due
process principles adopted by DHRM in R477-ll-l(1).
Fourth, the burden of proving "consistent application" is
not an onerous burden to impose on a state agency.

State

agencies maintain personnel files on all state employee, see
U.C.A. 67-18-1 (1953, as amended), and can readily access
information to prove that it acted consistently and fairly in any
given case.

In contrast, the Government Records Access and

Management Act, U.C.A. 63-2-101,et.seq.(1953, as amended),
specifically prohibits employees from obtaining records of other
employees who have been disciplined:
"63-2-304 Protected records.
The following records are protected if
properly classified by a governmental
entity:...
(8) records created or maintained for civil,
criminal, or administrative enforcement
purposes or audit purposes, or for
discipline, licensing, certification, or
17

registration purposes, if release of the
records:
(a) reasonably could be expected to
interfere with investigations undertaken for
enforcementf discipline, licensing,
certification/ or registration purposes;
(b) reasonably could be expected to
interfere with auditsf disciplinary. or
enforcement proceedings; ..." U.C.A. 63-2304(8) (1953f as amended).
The CSRB's ruling thus has the effect of forever preventing
a career service employee from proving an agency acted in an
inconsistent manner because the employee will not be able to
obtain the records necessary to carry that burden.

The CSRBrs

analysis therefore places a burden on the career service employee
that he/she can never carry.

The CSRB's analysis is neither

reasonable nor rational because it requires career service
employees to do that which it is impossible for them to do.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should overrule the
CSRB and hold that UDOT had the burden of proving consistent
application in imposing disciplinary actions.

This Court should

further hold that when an agency fails to meet its necessary
burden of proof, it is therefore precluded from imposing
disciplinary measures in that case.
II.
THE HEARING OFFICER EXCEEDED HIS AUTHORITY
BYf SUA SPONTE, RE-OPENING THE RECORD.
Administrative agencies have only that authority that is
18

expressly or impliedly granted by statute.

Nielsen v. Div. of

P.O.S.T.. 851 P.2d 1201 (Ut. App. 1993) (citations omitted).
This court has previously reversed the CSRB on occasions where
the CSRB exceeded the authority it possessed by its own
administrative rules.

See, Utah Department of Corrections v.

Despain. 824 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1991);

Utah Department of

Corrections v. Sucher, 796 P.2d 721 (Utah App. 1990).
The CSRB had adopted a procedure for closing the record in
evidentiary hearings:
"Closing of the Record. After all testimony,
documentary evidence, and arguments have been
presented, the hearing officer shall close
the record and terminate the proceeding,
unless one or both parties agree to submit a
posthearing brief within a specified time."
R137-1-20E. (Emphasis supplied).
The CSRB has further specified that rehearings are not
permitted, R137-1-20L, and that only the evidentiary record will
be considered by the CSRB at subsequent appellate hearings. See
R137-1-21E.

Furthermore, the Hearing Officer is required by CSRB

rule to issue a written decision after closing of the record:
"Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law.
Following the closing of the record, the
hearing officer shall make and enter a
written decision containing findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The decision and
order is filed with the administrator and
without further action becomes the decision
and order of the evidentiary hearing." R1371-20G.
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Additionally, a Step 5 Hearing Officer, Sherry Guyon, had
addressed the issue of re-opening the record in a decision prior
to the case at bar.

In Kent v. Dept. of Employment Security, 10

CSRB/H.O. 138 (Step 5 Decision on Motion to Reopen Hearing), Ms.
Guyon held that the counterpart to the current rule on closing
the record did not permit a re-opening of the record:
"By making a very strict interpretation of
R140-1-20E (now R137-1-20E), the Hearing
Officer concludes that it would be an abuse
of discretion to re-open a hearing for
additional evidence, testimony or documents,
once it has been formally closed, because no
specific provisions are set forth to do so."
Id.P at 2. (A copy of the Decision on Motion
to Reopen Hearing is set forth in the
Addendum).
Finally, UDOT's counsel did not dispute Lunnen's argument
that Mr. Martinez could not re-open the record once it was
closed:
"Agency is extremely concerned and troubled
by the procedure used by the Hearing Officer
in this case. Counsel for Agency has in fact
submitted Memorandums to at least one
different Hearing Officer arguing that once
the record is closed, a decision MUST be made
on the evidence presented at the hearing and
that it is inappropriate to give a party
another bite at the apple." Agency's Step 6
Brief, at 21. (Emphasis in original).
In spite of UDOT's admission and Ms. Guyon's decision, the
CSRB ruled Ms. Guyon's decision to be correct but that the
Hearing Officer has independent authority anyway to re-open the
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hearing.

The CSRB's analysis is predicated upon its reading of

R137-1-20J:
"Scope of Remedy/Relief. If the hearing
officer finds that the action complained of
which was taken by the appointing authority
was too severe, even though for good cause,
the hearing officer may provide for such
other remedy or relief as deemed appropriate
and in the best interest of the respective
parties."
The CSRB asserts this rule modifies the provision concerning
closing the record set forth in R137-1-20E such that a Hearing
Officer may re-open the record.

The CSRB's analysis ignores the

unambiguous language and intent of subsection J in that this
subsection grants the Hearing Officer authority to fashion a
remedy he/she believes appropriate based on the record.

Nowhere

does this subsection hint that the Hearing Officer is granted
authority to open a record once the same has been closed.
The Step 5 Hearing Officer and the CSRB did not act
reasonably or rationally in interpreting the rules adopted by the
CSRB.

This Court should so hold that the Hearing Officer had no

authority to re-open the record.
III.
UDOT DID NOT PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF
CONSISTENT APPLICATION AT THE EVIDENTIARY
HEARING.
The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence to be
"that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate
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to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion."

Mountain

Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 861 P.2d 414, 428 (Utah
1993) (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, the trier of fact (the Hearing Officer)
was never persuaded that UDOT had presented any pertinent or
persuasive evidence on the consistency of the discipline imposed.
The only evidence presented on the issue was by Gene
Sturzenegger.

That complete testimony is as follows:

H

Q. Is this a situation where Mr. Lunnen is
the first individual that has been
disciplined with a demotion because of
failure to respond to call outs?
A.

No.

Q. Have you in the district knowledge of any
other person that has been demoted for a
similar offense?
A. Yes.
Q. What do you recall —
this took place?

do you recall when

A. It was about two years ago, roughly, the
individual is off of the Tooele Station,
Station 223.
Q. Was it your recommendation from the
district that this particular individual be
terminated?
A. He was a Grade 17 as I recall, and we
recommended termination. It was changed at a
later date with the concurrence of the
district and changed to a Grade 15, demoted
to Grade 15 with ten or so percent cut in
salary.
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Q. And do you recallf without going into all
of the details, just exactly why he was? Did
he just not respond once or what was the
situation?
A. There was quite a few times that he
didn't respond. Either the last event was,
you know, just not responding for snow
removal. You know, his home was called, he
was there, he didn't respond." Step 5
transcript at 18-19.
In his Final Decision, the Hearing Officer characterized the
foregoing testimony as what UDOT "thought" was appropriate
discipline.

The Hearing Officer simply did not find the evidence

to be persuasive or credible.

The Hearing Officer further

believed UDOT was principally asserting Lunnen's insubordination
as a basis for demotion because that was the heart of UDOT's
closing argument:
"We believe that the disciplinary action is
fair in light of the infraction and the
offense that he committed, which was
insubordination. He was insubordinate, was
nonfeasance and misfeasance existed in this
failure to respond to the direction that he
received, particularly after he acknowledged
it. With this we conclude our arguments that
we feel that the action of the department
should be sustained by the hearing officer."
Step 5 transcript, at 206.
Despite not hearing the testimony of Mr. Sturzenegger nor
the arguments of UDOT's representative, the CSRB usurped the
Hearing Officer's province by deciding the credibility of a
witness (Mr. Sturzenegger) and determining his testimony to be
substantial and credible evidence.
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If the Hearing Officer

thought the evidence was sufficient and substantialf the Hearing
Officer would have had no occasion to improperly re-open the
record!
Moreover, the CSRB totally ignored UDOT's argument contained
in the transcript that UDOT believed a demotion was appropriate
because of the nature of the misconduct —

insubordination1

The

CSRB opines that UDOT's demotion of Lunnen was not solely because
of insubordination but was also because of poor performance in
the past.

Yet the CSRB again completely ignores Joint Exhibits 1

and 2, which are performance ratings covering the time period of
July 1, 1990 through June 30, 1992.

In those evaluations, Lunnen

was rated successful overall in his performance.

While he did

receive a less than successful rating on the "24 hour call"
obligation, Lunnen nevertheless received successful ratings. If
Lunnen is a successful employee, then how can he be demoted for
this successful performance?

The answer is that he cannot and

the CSRB's reliance on Lunnen's performance as a basis for
demotion is not supported by the record.
Furthermore, the Hearing Officer properly understood the
importance of Lunnen's performance evaluations in his Interim
Order:
"The Agency offered one instance of
insubordination and a commensurate demotion
as proof of consistency of application.
Taking into account the long and valued work
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performance of Lunnen, it does not appear
that a demotion for this act is consistent
with prior discipline imposed by the Agency.M
Step 5 Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Interim Order With
Continuing Jurisdiction, at page 8.
The CSRB cannot "pick and choose" the evidence it wants to
consider.

The CSRB must consider the totality of the evidence

presented.

The CSRB did not consider the performance evaluations

of Lunnen in deciding this case nor the credibility of the
witness.

The CSRB's decision simply ignores the straight-forward

evidence in the record.

The CSRB's decision is not supported by

substantial evidence and must be overturned.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the decision of the Career Service
Review Board and order that UDOT had the burden of proof
regarding consistent application of discipline and that it failed
to carry that burden by presenting substantial, credible evidence
on the issue.

This Court should further order that Lunnen be

reinstated to his former position, with back pay, for the reason
that UDOT failed to carry its burden of proof.

Dated t h i s

//

day of

/fcy

, 1994.

Respectfully submitted,

Phillip W. Dyer
Attorney for Petitioner Lunnen

k/mi/Lunnen.bri/APPl
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ADDENDUM

BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In The Matter Of:

:

JAMES M. LUNNEN,

:

DECISION AND FINAL

Grievant,

:

AGENCY ACTION

v.

:

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

:
:
:
:

Agency.

Case Nos. 5 CSRB 46 (Step 6)
11 CSRB/H.O. 154 (Step 5)

The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate review
of the above-captioned matter on August 12, 1993. The following Board Members heard oral
argument and later deliberated in the decision-making process: Chairman Bruce T. Jones, Jean
M. Bishop, David M. Hilbig and Jose L. Trujillo.

James M. Lunnen (Mr. Lunnen and

Appellant) was not present, but was represented by Phillip W. Dyer, Attorney at Law, as
counsel to the Utah Public Employees' Association. Assistant Attorney General Stephen G.
Schwendiman, Office of the Attorney General, represented the Utah Department of
Transportation (Department and UDOT). A certified court reporter from Tempest Reporting
made a verbatim record of oral argument before the Board, which is commonly referred to as
a Step 6 appeal hearing under the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures.

AUTHORITY
The CSRB's statutory provisions are set forth at §§67-19a-101 through -408 of the Utah
Code Unannotated (1993 Supp.). Effective November 2,1992, the CSRB's provisions at R137-120 C. and -21 D. were amended through the State's rulemaking procedures at §§63-46a et seq.
These amended provisions are applicable to the evidentiary/Step 5 proceedings in this matter,
which occurred on November 10 and 13, 1992.

This case proceeded properly through the State's grievance procedures, and the Board
has assumed jurisdiction over Mr. Lunnen's appeal to Step 6. The Step 6 or Board-level review
constitutes the final step in the administrative review under the codified Grievance and Appeal
Procedures, according to §§67-19a-202(l)(a), -407 and -408, as well as constituting a final agency
action under §63-46b-14 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). All UAPA formal
adjudicatory provisions are applicable to the CSRB's proceedings at both Steps 5 and 6. After
closing the record following oral argument, the Board Members entered into an executive
session for deliberation and decision-making.
After considering the record as a whole and the arguments presented at the Board-level
hearing, the Board sustains the Step 5 Decision and denies Mr. Lunnen's appeal.

ISSUES
A. Issues Adjudicated at Step 5 Hearing
The following twofold issues were noticed for the evidentiary/Step 5 proceedings as the
issues to be adjudicated:
1. Was Grievant demoted for just cause?
2. If not, what is the appropriate remedy?
On these issues, the CSRB hearing officer ruled that just cause supported Mr. Lunnen's
demotion, and that his penalty was neither excessive, disproportionate nor an abuse of
discretion.
B. Issues Presented on Appeal to Step 6
Mr. Lunnen comes before this Board arguing three issues upon appeal to Step 6. First,
Appellant argues that the Department failed to carry its burden of proof; therefore, his
disciplinary penalty should be vacated, and that Mr. Lunnen should be reinstated to his former
Grade 19 position and his lost pay restored. Second, Mr. Lunnen urges the Board to rule that
its hearing officers do not have authority to reopen the record at Step 5 proceedings once the
record has been closed. Third, Appellant Lunnen avers that the CSRB hearing officer violated
the following: (a) provision §63-46b-10(3) of the UAPA, (b) the residuum rule, and (c) the
Utah Court of Appeals' holding in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23 (Ut. App.
1991). (Hereinafter, the Tolman case.)
C. The Board's Appellate Standards of Review

.?.

Effective November 2, 1992, the Board amended its standards of review provision at
R137-1-21 D.

Thus, the recently amended version of R137-1-21 D. is applicable to

Mr. Lunnen's appeal to the Board at Step 6. The just-mentioned provision states:
D. The Board's Standards of Review. The board's standards of
review shall be based upon the following criteria:
1. The board shall first make a determination of whether the
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and
rational in accordance with the substantial evidence standard. If
the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB
hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its
discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or
additional factual findings.
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual findings
of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has
corrected the factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5
record as a whole, the board must then determine whether the
CSRB hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies,
rules, and statutes in accordance with the correctness standard,
with no deference being granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision
of the CSRB hearing officer.
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the
CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions
imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the
ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant
policies, rules, and statutes determined in accordance with the
above provisions.
The above-quoted provisions constitute the Board's standards by which this case will be
reviewed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Event Giving Rise to the Appeal
Mr. Lunnen is a long term State career service employee. He has been employed with
the Department continuously since being hired permanently on March 6, 1978, at a Grade 15.
The Department promoted Appellant to Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 17, effective
September 21, 1985. Four and one-half years later (April 1, 1989), Appellant Lunnen was
promoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 19, a lead worker position. The State's
classification specification for an employee in Mr. Lunnen's job title stipulates under the
category of working conditions that an incumbent: " . . . may be subject to 24 hour call; may
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be required to have access to an operating telephone or equivalent method of contact in case
of emergency." (Jt. Exht. 4.)
Paul Crosland, Mr. Lunnen's immediate supervisor, rated Lunnen on his FY90-91
performance appraisal under the 24-hour call-out performance objective as borderline
acceptable ("satisfactory/unsatisfactory").

Thus, Supervisor Crosland noted that Appellant

Lunnen is "Sometime[s] hard to get a hold of for snow removal at night," (Jt. Exht. 1). By
rating Mr. Lunnen as borderline or "S/U" for his poor call-out response record, Mr. Crosland
had served warning on him regarding this problem.

On the following year's FY91-92

performance appraisal, Supervisor Crosland again cautioned Mr. Lunnen about his completely
inadequate ("unsatisfactory") emergency call-out response record under the same 24-hour callout objective: "I need [your] help on call out[s] (may be subject to 24 hour call). Thank you
for getting a phone again," (Jt. Exht. 2). Supervisor Crosland had now warned Mr. Lunnen for
two consecutive years about the latter's inadequate emergency call-out response rate.
During early 1992, Appellant further failed in responding to emergency call-outs.
Additionally, for more than eight months he lacked a required residential telephone (Crosland,
T. 62; Mrs. Lunnen, 142). Mr. Lunnen blamed personal bankruptcy problems for his lack of
a residential telephone (T. 30), even though UDOT officials had offered him assistance in
getting his telephone re-installed (T. 30-31). As Appellant lacked a residential telephone during
this eight month period, Department officials provided him with a pager (T. 93), so that when
paged, Mr. Lunnen either returned calls to Supervisor Crosland or showed up at the coded
UDOT station appearing on his pager. When Mr. Lunnen twice complained that his pager
didn't work properly, Mr. Crosland took it to be repaired and returned it to him on the same
day (T. 73, 173). Each time the repair operator returned the pager in working condition.
On April 2, 1992, Mr. Lunnen had been directed to meet with District 2 Maintenance
Area Supervisor Ron Smith and Station Supervisor Paul Crosland concerning his continuing
failure in not responding to several recent after-hours call-outs (T. 57-58). Mr. Lunnen .was
informed that a disciplinary penalty would be imposed if he did not improve his call-out
responses (T. 78). Supervisor Crosland expressed his extreme concern that Mr. Lunnen still
lacked a telephone after more than eight months, and that Appellant was not yet responding
to emergency call-outs as instructed. Appellant Lunnen was ordered to get a home telephone
installed within two weeks (Jt. Exht. 5). Mr. Crosland informed Mr. Lunnen that he absolutely
had to have a telephone as a continuing condition of his employment with UDOT. Appellant
complied.

-4-

Other employees on Mr. Crosland's crew had long harbored ill feelings due to Mr.
Lunnen's many absences on call-outs (T. 86-87). Appellant Lunnen's failure to respond in
emergency situations placed a greater burden on his fellow crew members, who had to work
additional hours (T. 21, 87). Mr. Lunnen's continued absences caused morale problems within
Crosland's crew. Area Maintenance Supervisor Smith observed that Lunnen's history of not
responding to call-outs dated back to 1983 (T. 54, 63). Supervisor Crosland also testified that
Lunnen had a long history of not responding (T. 71, 79, 87), even though he had been twice
promoted.
UDOT District 2 Director Gene Sturzenegger later summarized this April 2
meeting in his subsequent July 7, 1992 report:
Mr. Lunnen was also told that if he didn't show a
cooperate, make arrangements for a telephone
available for emergency call-outs, it would be
recommend disciplinary action. Mr. Lunnen did
telephone one day after the deadline given him
(Emphasis supplied.)

willingness to
and also be
necessary to
arrange for a
(Jt. Exht. 5).

The above paragraph's content was originally conveyed to Mr. Lunnen in verbal context
through his supervisors (Smith and Crosland) during their April 2 meeting with him.
Importantly, Appellant Lunnen was placed on notice through a direct, specific verbal warning
that he faced disciplinary action if he did not respond to call-outs, and if he did not obtain a
telephone in his home.
Next, Mr. Lunnen received a formal Warning Notice, dated June 16, 1992, from both
Supervisor Crosland and UDOTs District 2 engineer that clearly stated Lunnen was still not
properly responding to emergency call-outs upon being notified by telephone. The Warning
Notice explained that Mr. Lunnen had again failed to report as directed during the evening of
June 12, 1992, regarding the following incident:
On June 12th, Mr. Lunnen was contacted by the dispatcher and
asked to come to work as there was an emergency blowup of the
concrete at 1-215 and approximately 700 West. Virgil Bair was
waiting for Mr. Lunnen to help him on the road. After a
considerable amount of time, Mr. Bair contacted the dispatcher
[again] and asked that Mr. Lunnen be contacted again for an
estimated time of arrival. At that time, Mr. Bair was informed
that their [UHP Dispatch] call to Mr. Lunnen was answered by a
machine and that Mr. Lunnen was not available. Personnel
Bulletins state, "employee must be willing and able to work night
shifts" and "may be subject to 24-hour call." (Jt. Exht. 3.)
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The written Warning Notice by both the District 2 engineer and Station Supervisor Crosland
carried a recommendation that Appellant be immediately demoted for his failure to report as
directed during the emergency call-out on June 12.
B. Departmental Proceedings
District 2 Director Sturzenegger supported both supervisors' June 16 written Warning
Notice's recommended demotion of Appellant based upon his failure in responding to the
June 12 1-215 emergency call-out.

In his July 7, 1992 recommendation for Mr. Lunnen's

demotion, Director Sturzenegger considered Appellant's explanation for not responding to the
June 12 emergency call-out, and found his explanation lacking credibility and his conduct
inexcusable:
. . . Mr. Lunnen was contacted by Highway Patrol Dispatch
because of an emergency situation on 1-215. Mr. Lunnen
answered the initial call and agreed to come to work. When he
did not arrive, Dispatch was asked to contact him again and their
call was answered by a machine saying he was not available. He
was also paged and did not answer his pager.
When Mr. Lunnen was asked why he did not respond, he said he
thought someone was playing a joke on him because there was
laughing and giggling on the telephone.
In an effort to verify his statement, arrangements were made to
listen to the tapes from Dispatch. There was no evidence of
laughing and giggling, only a call requesting that he respond to an
emergency on 1-215. He agreed to respond. The second call
[s]hows that it was answered by an answering machine. A copy of
this tape has been retained by the District for future use.
The just-mentioned UHP Dispatch tape was submitted to and heard by the CSRB
hearing officer (Finding of Fact No. 26). The Dispatch tape conveys Mr. Lunnen answering
the telephone, receiving the call-out message, and agreeing to report to work, as instructed.
But he did not report. Mr. Lunnen fully disregarded this call-out notification. The Dispatch
operator called again about 30-45 minutes later but no one answered Mr. Lunnen's telephone.
The Lunnens' telephone answering machine had been turned on and a message was left.
Mr. Lunnen and his wife testified that it was not uncommon for those on Supervisor Crosland's
crew to call each other during off-duty time, especially during televised sporting events, and
pretend to report an emergency call-out. Mrs. Lunnen stated that the prank calls were more
common during winter months, than during other seasons (T. 141). According to Appellant
Lunnen, he, his wife, and his co-workers all participated in such pranks as a means of
attempting to hoodwink each other into going out on a false report. At the Step 5 hearing,
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Mr. Lunnen acknowledged that he did not properly respond to the June 12 emergency call-out,
but defended his failure by laying blame on the prankster practice prevalent among Supervisor
Crosland's crew. Mr. Lunnen's demotion was directly precipitated by his failure to report as
directed during the June 12 evening emergency call-out on 1-215.
On July 2, 1992, UDOT's District 2 director requested via memo to the Department's
executive director that Mr. Lunnen be demoted from Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 19
to Grade 17, with an accompanying 11 percent salary reduction.

On July 13, 1992, the

Department's executive director notified Appellant Lunnen of his intent to demote him.
Mr. Lunnen appealed the Department's proposed demotion. A three-member departmental
grievance panel heard Mr. Lunnen's story and considered his appeal in an informal administrative hearing. Afterwards, the three-person departmental grievance panel recommended to
UDOT's executive director that Mr. Lunnen be demoted from Grade 19 to 17 but with an
accompanying 2.75 percent salary reduction (a one-step reduction on the State's pay plan)
rather than the previously proposed 11 percent. Effective August 15, 1992, Appellant was
demoted and his pay rate decreased according to the grievance panel's recommendation.
Mr. Lunnen properly and timely appealed this disciplinary penalty through the CSRB's
grievance procedures at Steps 5 and 6.
C. Interim Order
The CSRB hearing officer issued his Step 5 Decision in two separate rulings. The first
Step 5 ruling, issued on January 5, 1993, was entitled "Findings'of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Interim Order with Continuing Jurisdiction" (Interim Order). In that document, the trier
of fact accepted the parties' joint stipulation of facts as the material factual basis of this case.
The CSRB examiner supplemented the evidentiary record with his additional factual findings,
and then made legal conclusions. Therein, the Interim Order assessed Mr. Lunnen's duty to
comply with the call-out order given him by UHP Dispatch by telephone on June 12, against
Mr. Lunnen's excuses for not complying: believing the call might be a purported telephone
prank from one or more crew members, a family member mistakenly turning on his answering
machine, and his pager not being activated that evening. The CSRB hearing officer considered
the witnesses' demeanor, observed their degree of eye contact, their vocal responses along with
tonal qualities, and weighed all testimonial and documentary evidence along with each
witnesses' credibility.

The transcript contains numerous inconsistencies when comparing

Mr. and Mrs. Lunnens' testimony with that of the other witnesses. The trier of fact rejected
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Mr. Lunnen's so-called prank alibi as an attempt to efface the latter's complete failure to
comply with a valid, twice-made emergency call-out:
Lunnen believes this is an intervening event [prank alibi] that
does exculpate him. Lunnen did not verify with anyone at work
that the call was not legitimate. Lunnen cannot validate his
failure to respond by putting up a defense that is of his own
creation. His non-response is not based upon legitimate grounds,
but upon a reason that should not exist because it has the ability
to harm someone or cause someone injury if the result is as in
this case. (Interim Order, p. 7.)
Having determined that Appellant Lunnen lacked a valid reason when he chose not to
respond to the June 12 emergency call-out, the evidentiary examiner next essayed whether
Mr. Lunnen's behavior warranted demotion as a proper disciplinary penalty for his failure to
respond to a directly-requested emergency call-out. "There is no doubt [Lunnen] disobeyed
the orders of a superior," concluded the CSRB hearing officer (Interim Order, p. 7).
Disobedience to the orders of a superior is insubordination. The
act is also malfeasance and misfeasance in that Lunnen did not do
something he should have done and/or did it wrongfully. No
matter how we characterize the act, it meets the requirement for
discipline. (Ibid., pp. 7-8.)
The evidentiary examiner further concluded that the Department had proper authority to
discipline Mr. Lunnen, and that Appellant, in turn, had been insubordinate by his failure to
obey the lawful order of a superior by taking into account Mr. Lunnen's prior knowledge that
he was subject to 24-hour emergency call-out duty (Ibid. p. 9).
After having concluded that some form of discipline was appropriate, the Interim Order
considered the Department's particular sanction of a demotion.

Specifically, the CSRB

examiner contemplated whether a demotion from Grade 19 to 17 with an accompanying 2.75
percent pay loss was consistent with other UDOT employees' disciplinary penalties for a firsttime insubordination incident. Opined the CSRB examiner in his Interim Order at page 8:
The Agency [UDOT] offered one instance of insubordination and
a commensurate demotion as proof of consistency of application.
Taking into account the long and valued work performance of
Lunnen, it does not appear that a demotion for this act is
consistent with prior discipline imposed by [UDOT]. There is no
dispute that Lunnen knew about the call-out policy of 24-hours
and that he knew he was subject to it; but, there is no proof that
it is a mandatory policy nor that anyone else has been disciplined
for not responding to the call-out, except the one incident
mentioned above. There is substantial evidence from both sides
that any excuse for not responding was accepted as being valid.
In this case, Lunnen had no excuse.
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Noting that §67-19a-406 places the burden of proof on the Department in appeals
stemming from demotion, the CSRB hearing officer observed that UDOT "has not provided
any proof that the demotion of Lunnen is consistent with prior discipline for one act of
insubordination." (Ibid. p. 8.) Consequently, the CSRB hearing officer ordered that Lunnen's
demotion and pay rate decrease be held in abeyance "pending proof by the [Department] that
it is consistent with other similarly situated employees." UDOT was directed to submit "its best
proof of what discipline is consistently given to employees of the [Department] for a first time
insubordination, i.e., failure to obey the order of a supervisor," (Ibid, p. 9). According to the
Step 5 Interim Order, should the Department be able to provide proof of consistent treatment
for first time acts of insubordination, the examiner stated that he would "then ratify [Lunnen's]
appropriate discipline." Otherwise, if UDOT failed to show consistency of discipline for
similarly situated employees, the trier of fact would then "select the most appropriate one from
those disciplines most regularly imposed," with any subsequent adjustment to Lunnen's grade
and pay being adjusted later (Ibid., p. 9). The Interim Order concluded that "the record shall
remain open" during the period UDOT submits its supporting evidence of previous demotion
actions.
D. Final Order
On March 15, 1993, the CSRB examiner issued his "Final Order and Decision to Step 5
Proceedings" (Step 5 Decision). Having previously established that UDOT had just cause to
discipline Lunnen, the CSRB hearing officer now assessed "the degree of severity of the
disciplinary penalty, since neither party had argued the issues of severity, consistency or latitude
of discipline," (Step 5 Decision, p. 1). After considering a selection of UDOT case histories
submitted pursuant to the Interim Order, regarding other previously disciplined UDOT
employees charged with insubordination, the Step 5 Decision ultimately concluded that
Mr. Lunnen's discipline was appropriately warranted, and was neither inconsistent nor
excessive.

THE DEPARTMENT AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Appellant claims that the Department failed to carry its burden of proof with respect
to the propriety of its disciplinary sanction. However, while Mr. Lunnen concedes that "UDOT
presented substantial evidence of [his] misconduct," (Brief, p. 9), he asserts that UDOT "wholly
failed to prove" the propriety of its demotion and salary reduction. Because our amended
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evidentiaiy standard is a two-tier standard, we review R137-1-20 C. 1. and 2., and apply these
provisions to Mr. Lunnen's factual situation.
A. Burden of Proof - Misconduct Proved
R137-1-20 C. 1. states:
The CSRB hearing officer shall first make factual findings based
solely on the evidence presented at the hearing without deference
to any prior factual findings of the agency. The CSRB hearing
officer shall then determine whether: (a) the factual findings
made from the evidentiary/Step 5 hearing support with substantial
evidence the allegations made by the agency or the appointing
authority, and (b) the agency had correctly applied relevant
policies, rules, and statutes.
In his Interim Order, the examiner explicitly found that: "There is no doubt Grievant
disobeyed the orders of a superior. Disobedience to the orders of a superior is insubordination/' (Ibid, pp. 7-8.) Mr. Lunnen had received written notice on two consecutive annual
performance appraisals of his unsatisfactory call-out record. He and Supervisor Crosland had
engaged in many conversations over the years regarding this problem (T. 78, 86). Appellant
had met with his supervisors on April 2, and was told specifically that his ongoing failure to
adequately respond would result in discipline unless he improved his call-out response record.
Supervisor Crosland's records show that Mr. Lunnen responded to only three call-outs during
the period of January 1 through June 21, 1992, while he failed to respond to 11 other call-outs
(T. 75). Appellant's response rate was only 20 percent for 3 out of 14 call-out requests in his
crew. The next lowest response rate was 40 percent (Agency Exht. 1). Yet even after his
supervisors' verbal warning on April 2, Lunnen did not respond on June 12, when he personally
received a telephone call, acknowledged the UHP dispatcher's message to report, stated he
would be responding, but for inexplicable reasons deliberately chose not to report.
That evening Mr. Lunnen had been watching a basketball game on television when the
call came about 10:00 p.m. The UHP Dispatch caller directed Appellant to report promptly
to a section of ruptured concrete slab (a "blow up") emergency at 1-215 and 700 West.
Appellant stated to the dispatcher that he would respond ("O. K."), but he did not. A halfhour or more later, the dispatcher called again but found Mr. Lunnen's answering machine
turned on, and no one picked up the incoming call. Dispatch also tried alerting Mr. Lunnen
with the pager but he had not activated it. Appellants' witnesses testified that it was District
2 policy to report if you were at home and got called out (T. 130, 134), as did Lunnen himself
(T. 172). Moreover, Mr. Lunnen had known since his meeting with supervisors on April 2 that
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he would be under penalty of discipline should he not improve his call-out response record
(T. 86).
Mr. Lunnen defended himself for the June 12 incident by claiming that he thought the
Dispatch call had been made by fellow crew members, although none had called back to claim
it was a prank. Both Appellant and his wife stated that with prank calls, someone always called
shortly afterwards and identified the call as a prank (T. 171). No one really wanted a crew
member to go out on a false report (T. 171). Appellant acknowledged that he had no
reasonable basis upon which to believe that this call was anything but legitimate, and not bogus.
Importantly, Mr. Lunnen had given no indication that he would not be responding nor did he
verify with anyone at UDOT or UHP Dispatch that the call was not valid. Quite the opposite,
Appellant stated that he would be responding that evening. Substantial evidence shows that
Mr. Lunnen committed insubordination through his misconduct when he refused his
supervisors' standing orders to respond to emergency call-outs when contacted, uniess not in
a condition or circumstance to respond.
UDOT effectively marshalled the evidence against Mr. Lunnen's wrongdoing at the
evidentiary proceeding below.

Even Appellant acknowledges such in his Brief at page 9:

"Admittedly, UDOT presented substantial evidence of [Appellant's] misconduct . . . ." After
hearing the evidence, the CSRB examiner then determined that under R137-1-20 C. 1.,
substantial evidence supported the Department's allegations of insubordination and misconduct
as described in the executive director's July 13 and August 10 disciplinary action letters. We
conclude that the evidentiary examiner made accurate factual findings, which were reasonable
and rational based upon the record as a whole, as required by R137-1-20 C. 1.
Next, the hearing officer complied with R137-1-20 C. 2., when he determined that
Appellant's disciplinary sanction of a demotion and a one-step pay rate decrease was not
excessive, disproportionate or abusive.
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B. Burden of Proof - Penalty
Appellant Lunnen argues that UDOT failed to meet its burden of proof on showing the
propriety of a two-grade demotion coupled with a pay rate reduction.1 First, the codified
grievance and appeal procedures place upon an agency the burden of proof in all disciplinary
grievances, including demotions (§67-19a-406(2)(a)). Then the evidentiary examiner properly
applied the Board's provision at R137-1-20 C. 2., which states:
When the CSRB hearing officer determines in accordance with
the procedures set forth above that the evidentiary step 5 factual
findings support the allegations of the agency or the appointing
authority, then the CSRB hearing officer must determine whether
the agency's decision, including any disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive, disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an
abuse of discretion. In making this latter determination, the
CSRB hearing officer shall give deference to the decision of the
agency or the appointing authority unless the agency's penalty is
determined to be excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an
abuse of discretion in which instance the CSRB hearing officer
shall determine the appropriate remedy.
Mr. Lunnen has misread or misunderstood the examiner's Step 5 Decision with respect
to the following portion that is quoted in Appellant's Brief at page 2:
Mr. Lunnen argues in his Motion For Reconsideration that the
Agency did not prove a demotion was consistent discipline for one
act of insubordination. That is true.
But, importantly, continued the hearing officer, in the immediately following sentences:
However, this does not invalidate the finding that Lunnen was,
without doubt and by substantial proof, insubordinate and the
only evidence received was that the reduction in grade was what
the Agency thought was just and consistent with prior discipline.
Therefore, it was for Lunnen's benefit that further proof of
consistency was required. (Ibid., pp. 2-3.)
The CSRB hearing officer did not state that Mr. Lunnen's discipline was not
appropriate, as argued in the latter's Brief. Having found just cause to discipline Mr. Lunnen,
the examiner stated that the remaining issue to be decided was that of "the degree of severity
of the disciplinary penalty, since neither party had argued the issues of severity, consistency or
latitude of discipline," (Step 5 Decision, p. 1). Contrary to Mr. Lunnen's argument that the
hearing officer did not find his penalty "appropriate" (Brief, p. 9), the evidentiary examiner
specifically determined that Lunnen's demotion was consistent with UDOT's other imposed
sanctions "for one act of insubordination." Mr. Lunnen misreads the Step 5 Decision when
he contends that the evidentiary record lacks substantial evidence for sustaining his
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demotion—even on the basis of alleging a lack of consistent disciplinary application by the
Department.
The Interim Order states that, "The Agency offered one instance of insubordination and
a commensurate demotion as proof of consistency of application" (Ibid., p. 8). Next, the
hearing officer concluded: "The Agency has not provided any proof that the demotion of
Lunnen is consistent with prior discipline for one act of insubordination" (Ibid.) On that basis,
the trier of fact left the record open long enough for the Department to submit prior examples
of other employees' demotions based upon a single act of insubordination. In contrast, the
Board finds that the record of the Step 5 proceedings contains sufficient credible substantial
evidence of UDOT's consistency of discipline upon which to satisfy the standard of R137-1-20
C. 2. The record evidence, based upon the facts and circumstances of Mr. Lunnen's case,
establishes just cause for his demotion and absent an excessive, disproportionate or abusive
penalty. Consequently, the Board concludes that it was not necessary to have the Department
further validate its decision by requiring an additional showing on the issue of consistency of
discipline. (See below.)

REOPENING THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD
A. Resolution of Issues at Step 5 Proceedings
In his Interim Order, the hearing officer sought to resolve three pertinent issues. The
first issue concerned Mr. Lunnen's argument that UDOT had failed to implement a corrective
action plan under R477-10-2. The trier of fact resolved this issue when he concluded that a
corrective action plan would have been appropriate for a job performance problem, but not for
Appellant's deliberate failure to report during an emergency call-out.

Acts of willful

misconduct fall under R477-11-1, which concerns insubordination, misfeasance, malfeasance and
nonfeasance or disobeying the orders of a superior (Ibid, pp. 6-7). As to the second or
misconduct issue, the examiner concluded that Mr. Lunnen had disobeyed the orders of a
superior, and that his disobedience constituted insubordination (Ibid., pp. 7-8). According to
the hearing officer, that left one last issue to be resolved: ". . . whether or not the demotion
[of Mr. Lunnen] is consistent with other employees' disciplinary penalties for insubordination,"
(Ibid., p. 8). Continued the Interim Order: 'The Agency offered one instance of insubordination and a commensurate demotion as proof of consistency for insubordination." Yet in the
following paragraph the Interim Order offers this contradictory statement: "The Agency has
not provided any proof that the demotion of Lunnen is consistent with prior discipline for one
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act of insubordination/' Hence the CSRB hearing officer held the record open2 in order for
the Department to submit supplemental proof of consistent discipline in first-act insubordination incidents.
B. Adequate Credible Substantial Evidence in the Record
The Step 5 proceedings' evidentiary record contains sufficiently credible substantial
evidence anent UDOT's prior discipline for a one-act offense of insubordination. District 2
Director Sturzenegger related an incident two years previously when another District 2
employee, a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 17, assigned to UDOT Station 223 in
Tooele, had repeatedly disregarded instructions to respond to emergency 24-hour call-outs,
when notified (T. 18). According to Mr. Sturzenegger, that employee had been called "quite
a few times" previously without responding (T. 19). On this occasion, the employee was at
home; he was called, answered the Dispatch call, but deliberately failed to respond. The Tooele
employee's insubordination resulted in a two-grade demotion coupled with a ten or eleven
percent pay decrease3 (T. 19). Hence, there is sufficient credible substantial evidence in
Director Sturzenegger's unrebutted testimony regarding the Tooele employee's insubordinate
actions to support UDOT's demotion of Mr. Lunnen. This evidence meets the Department's
burden of showing that it did not impose an excessive, disproportionate or abusive penalty upon
Mr. Lunnen. Therefore, the Department was not required to show supplemental proof
regarding consistent treatment vis-a-vis Mr. Lunnen's penalty.
As the Department presented substantial evidence of a prior case in which a similarly
situated UDOT employee was demoted two grades with an accompanying greater pay loss for
not responding to call-outs after many efforts by his supervisors, we hold that the Step 5
Interim Order's conclusionary finding ("The Agency has not provided any proof that the
demotion of Lunnen is consistent with prior discipline for one act of insubordination.") is
incorrect. However, it is clear from both the Interim Order and the final Step 5 Decision that
the hearing officer committed a misstatement rather than harmful error. The evidentiary
examiner's request for UDOT to produce more information regarding penalties for
insubordinate employees only benefitted Mr. Lunnen. This error, which favored Mr. Lunnen,
was de minimis, and neither harmful nor consequential to his interests. In sum, we conclude
that it was a moot issue for our hearing officer to have requested supplemental disciplinary
examples from UDOT regarding first-offense insubordination.
Another aspect of the Step 5 proceedings compels clarification. The hearing examiner
concentrated on Mr. Lunnen's failure in not reporting for an emergency call-out on June 12,
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after replying by telephone that he would. The hearing officer characterized this incident as
"one act of insubordination/' and as "a first time insubordination/' (Interim Order, pp. 8, 9;
also, Step 5 Decision, p. 2). We find that Mr. Lunnen's demotion and pay reduction was not
limited to the single event of not responding on June 12. Rather, Appellant had been notified
at his meeting with supervisors on April 2 that he needed to improve his call-out response.
Also, his response rate from January through June 21 was an unacceptable twenty percent.
Moreover, Appellant's performance appraisals for FY90-91 and 91-92 directed his attention to
his continuing problem of not satisfactorily responding to emergency call-outs. Mr. Lunnen had
a substantial work history of not properly responding to emergency call-outs. That unsatisfactory work history was pointed out in all three disciplinary documents: Sturzenegger's July 7
letter, and the executive director's July 13 and August 13 letters (Jt. Exhts. 5, 6, 7). Each of
these letters emphasized that Mr. Lunnen's insubordinate pattern and inadequate response
record were the cause of his pending demotion, not just "one act of insubordination." The
Department's penalty was based upon the totality of Mr. Lunnen's insubordinate behavior over
a lengthy period of time, not just for his failure on June 12.
C. Meeting Burden - Discipline
The Department had the burden of proof when the Step 5 proceedings commenced
(§67-19a-406(2)(a)). UDOT had the initial burden to show that its discipline was supported
by just cause. Once the agency has shown that its disciplinary sanction was reasonable and
correct in relation to the facts and circumstances, then the burden is on the employee to show
that the penalty imposed was disproportionate or otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion
(R137-1-20 C. 2.). Certainly inconsistency of treatment between similarly situated employees
could be a showing of disproportion, which could constitute an abuse of discretion. An abuse
of discretion results when a sanction is so unreasonable that it offends reasonable minds.
In Mr. Lunnen's situation, we conclude that there was a sufficiency of due process
provided at the Step 5 proceedings to support just cause for the discipline (please refer to
R477-11-1, Disciplinary Action).
D. Reopening Step 5 Proceedings
At the conclusion of Mr. Lunnen's Step 5 proceeding on November 13,1992, the CSRB
hearing officer remarked in his closing comment:
HEARING OFFICER: Thank you very much. That will close
argument in this case. An opinion will be rendered in writing in
twenty days beginning tomorrow to be provided to both parties
and counsel. I appreciate your professionalism, and it's been a
pleasure to have you before me (T. 217).
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Concededly, the hearing examiner had indeed "closed argument," although his exact words did
not state that he had actually closed the record. However, the evidentiary examiner's wording
implies a closing of the evidentiary record at that time. Hence, we assume that the record was
intended to be closed and was, in fact, closed at that time.
In his Interim Order, under the section labeled "Order," the Step 5 hearing officer
stated:
Pending modification or validation of the discipline, the record
shall remain open. This hearing and its record shall remain open
for purposes of appeal by Grievant until the discipline is imposed
and the time for appeal shall commence subsequent to a modification of this Order which imposes the discipline (Page 9).
However, Mr. Lunnen argues in his Brief (pp. 9-10) that, "Step 5 hearing officers do not
have authority to reopen the record." In support, Appellant cites our rule at R137-1-20 E.4
Appellant Lunnen further avers that the CSRB's rules only provide for the record remaining
open where, under R137-1-20 F., the parties agree to submit posthearing briefs. According to
Mr. Lunnen, "Absent such an agreement, R137-1-20 E. prohibits the presentation of further
evidence and the hearing officer is thereafter required to prepare Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law pursuant to R137-1-20 G." To further support his position, Appellant has
included another CSRB hearing officer's ruling which denied an agency's request to re-open
a Step 5 proceeding several days after the record was closed and the proceeding had adjourned.
The agency in Charles D. Kent v. Utah Department of Employment Security, 10 CSRB/H.0.138,
had requested to re-open the evidentiary proceedings to offer rebuttal testimony from a witness
not previously called but referred to in the grievant's testimony. Basing her denial on R137-120 E., the Board's hearing officer concluded that it would constitute an abuse of discretion for
her to re-open a hearing for the taking of additional evidence, once it had been formally closed.
The basis for that hearing officer's denial was "because no specific provisions are set forth to
do so." In the given circumstances, that hearing officer's decision was reasonable and legally
supportable. The Board determined that is was not necessary to re-open the hearing because
there was ample substantial evidence in the record to otherwise reach a proper decision {Kent,
p. 12).
There are provisions that enable our factfinders to obtain additional information within
their discretionary ambit. For example, R137-1-17 A. states:
Conduct. The purpose of a hearing is to provide a fair and
impartial opportunity to be heard so that the hearing officer may
be completely informed in the matter and enabled to render a
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proper determination based on all the facts and applicable laws
and rules.
Thus, to "be completely informed in the matter" a hearing officer may require additional
information from time to time. Also, R137-1-20 F. provides for the admission of posthearing
briefs and memoranda of law to be submitted along with "posthearing documents." That
provision may be read in concert with R137-1-20 A., which charges the hearing examiner to
"insure the development of a clear and complete record." Of particular import is R137-1-20
J.:
Scope of Remedy/Relief. If the hearing officer finds that the
action complained of which was taken by the appointing authority
was too severe, even though for good cause, the hearing officer
may provide for such other remedy or relief as deemed appropriate and in the best interest of the respective parties.
A hearing officer may well have a complete and correct understanding of all case facts,
all applicable rules and laws, and have all relevant pieces of information sorted out at the
conclusion of the hearing.

But not always. Hearing officers may need further time and

opportunity after the evidentiary hearing to analyze and weigh evidence, and sort out the
relevant information from the non-relevant. We hold that the hearing officer's sua sponte
request for additional information in Lunnen, where he issued a subsequent Interim Order
delineating the information he should receive from the agency, is not contrary to the CSRB
hearing officer's ruling in Kent, above. In the Kent decision, an agency sought on its own
motion to rebut testimony by later supplementing the Step 5 record after the record had been
closed and the proceedings adjourned.

The facts and circumstances of both cases are

substantially different, and the exigencies of each case resulted in proper but different
discretionary decisions by our hearing officers.
Essentially, we hold that where our hearing officer reasonably justifies re-opening a
Step 5 proceeding, that our hearing officer has sufficient discretion and authority to do so to
satisfy the ends of justice, to conduct a full and fair hearing, and to make a complete record.
The UAPA does not prohibit the CSRB hearing officer/presiding officer from re-opening an
evidentiary proceeding.

THE UAPA, THE RESIDUUM RULE, AND THE TOLMAN CASE
According to Mr. Lunnen, the Step 5 Decision violated the UAPA, the residuum rule,
and Utah Court of Appeals' holding in the Tolman case. These claimed violations challenge
the Interim Order's request for and the Step 5 Decision's acceptance of what the hearing
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officer called the Department's "best proof of what discipline is consistently given to employees
of the Agency for a first time insubordination, i.e., failure to obey the order of a supervisor/'
(page 9).

Specifically, Appellant objects to UDOT's posthearing submission of hearsay

evidence because he was not allowed to cross-examine any witnesses on the materials'
foundation, factual basis or trustworthiness. Mr. Lunnen feels strongly that his due process
rights have been violated by the process used to bring these documents into the record below.
This tribunal has given serious consideration to Appellant's argument. We understand
Mr. Lunnen's concerns regarding UDOT's evidence that was received after the evidentiary
proceeding went off the record. Furthermore, the Board comprehends the hearing officer's
purpose in requesting additional proof from the Department on the issue of consistency and
proportionate discipline between Mr. Lunnen and other UDOT employees previously
disciplined for similar acts of insubordination.
Grievance hearings are neither criminal nor civil proceedings, and different legal
standards and procedures apply.

With sufficient due process granted to both parties, the

hearing officer may need to gather additional facts and information on matters specific to a
case. Whether to "re-open" the entire proceeding or just the record falls within the hearing
officer's discretion. In the Lunnen case, the hearing officer was charged to adjudicate two
general issues/queries: (1) Did the Department have just cause to demote Mr. Lunnen?, and
(2) If not, what is the appropriate remedy?

Conceivably, answering these two issues may

require additional factfinding after the evidentiary proceeding has been closed. In writing a
factually accurate and a well reasoned decision, the hearing officer may require that further
factual information be adduced, so that all issues raised are adequately addressed and
purposefully resolved. This is to be accomplished temperately and with a mind to each party's
proper burdens. Burdens can and do shift on occasion during administrative proceedings. To
re-open or request additional information is not exclusively advantageous to one party or
another.
The CSRB's rules permit the Board to remand a case to the original hearing officer for
additional evidence-taking (R137-1-21 G.). Another provision, R137-1-21 H. 3., permits the
Board to re-open a case and supplement or amend the record. Also, the Board has authority
to compel new or additional evidence on its own motion (§67-19a-202(3)(c) and R137-1-21 B.).
The Board, then, has several means of gaining additional information even though the
evidentiary record below has long been closed. However, our appointed hearing officers retain
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jurisdiction until giving up that jurisdiction to the Board at Step 6. If circumstances compel,
our hearing officers may circumspectly re-open the record for further evidence-gathering.
Moreover, either party to a grievance hearing may request a reconsideration at Step 5
(R137-1-20 M.) or Step 6 (R137-1-21 J.), which is a re-examination of a decision permitted by
law (§63-46b-13).
We conclude that it is not necessary to rule upon Mr. Lunnen's third issue, because the
record contains District Director Sturzenegger's clear testimony that constitutes sufficient
credible substantial evidence—which was unrefuted by Mr. Lunnen. The hearing officer did
not need to request additional "best proof from UDOT because Director Sturzenegger's
testimony of the District 2 Tooele employee's misconduct and disciplinary penalty satisfies the
element of consistency and shows just cause for Mr. Lunnen's penalty under the CSRB's
standard at R137-1-20 C. 2. Consequently, because the case record, through the transcript,
contains sufficient evidence to satisfactorily determine the issue of consistency/abusive
discipline, we do not need to address the particular hearsay elements associated with the
UAPA, the residuum rule or with the Tolman case. Thus, having considered these three points
and finding them moot, it is not necessary to further address them.

DECISION
The hearing officer's Step 5 Decision is affirmed.

Mr. Lunnen's appeal to Step 6 is

denied, and therefore his remedy or relief cannot be granted. We hope that through improved
conduct he may be promoted again to a Grade 19 at an appropriate time. The record shows
that Mr. Lunnen has many good qualities, enjoys the support of his family, and has provided
many years of service to the state of Utah and the Department.
DECISION UNANIMOUS.
Bruce T. Jones, Chairman
Jean M. Bishop, Member
David M. Hilbig, Member
Jose L. Trujillo, Member
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DATED this ^ ^ Z

day of October 1993.

Bruce T. Jones, Chairma
Career Service"
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ENDNOTES
1. Mr. Lunnen's Brief at pages 2 and 9 mentions an eleven percent pay rate reduction. However, that percentage is incorrect as the penalty rate imposed
was actually 2.75 percent (Jt. Exht. 7), which constituted the percentage amount between steps on the Legislature's ncwrv authorized "step pay plan."
In Jury 1992, the State adopted the new "step pay plan" enacted during the Legislature's 1992 general session. See also. Interim Order, Fmding No. 13
Thus. Mr. Lunnen's actual pay rate decrease was much less severe than he presented in his Step 6 Brief
2. As stated on the Interim Order's last page:
. . . (T]he Agency had the authority to discipline Lunnen and that Lunnen was insubordinate
. The
discipline imposed shall be held in abeyance pending proof by the Agency that it is consistent with other
similarly situated employees. The Agency shall submit to this Hearing Officer . . . its best proof of what
discipline is consistently given to employees of the Agency for a first time insubordination, i. e., failure
to obey the order of a superior . . . .
Pending modification or validation of the discipline, the record shall remain open . . . .

3. There is ambiguity in the record as to whether the Tooele employee received a ten or an eleven percent pay
reduction. Both figures were cited side by side.
4 R137-1-20 E. reads:
Closing of the Record. After all testimony, documentary evidence, and arguments have been presented,
the hearing officer shall close the record and terminate the proceeding, unless one or both parties agree
to submit a postheanng brief within a specified time.

RECONSIDERATION
A party may apply for reconsideration of a Step 6 decision through R137-1-21J and Utah Code UnannotaUd,
§63-46b-13.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party may petition for judicial review of a final agency action pursuant to Utah Code UnannotaUd,
§63-46b-14 and -16.
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BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In The Matter Of:

:

JAMES M. LUNNEN,

:

FINAL ORDER
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:

AND DECISION TO

v.

:

STEP 5 PROCEEDINGS

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

:
:

Agency.

:

Case No. CSRB/H.O. 154

AUTHORITY
Pursuant to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Interim Order With
Continuing Jurisdiction issued by this Hearing Officer on January 5, 1993, and to
R137-1-20 A., which states that a Hearing Officer may require evidence be produced,
separate and apart from that received in a hearing, as governed by R137-1-20 B., this Final
Order issues.
Also, pursuant to R137-1-20 J., the CSRB Hearing Officer may, after finding
sufficient cause for sustaining disciplinary action by an agency, provide for a remedy or relief
"as deemed appropriate and in the best interest of the respective parties."
In this case the Hearing Officer found, and so held in bis Interim Order, that the
Agency had just cause to discipline Grievant for insubordination. The reniaming issue to
be decided then was the degree of severity of the disciplinary penalty, since neither party
had argued the issues of severity, consistency or latitude of discipline. Therefore, pursuant

to R137-1-20 J., this Hearing Officer issued his Interim Order, which included both Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but which delayed any finding on severity of Agency' s
action pending further submission by the parties and in the best interests of the respective
parties.
Since the issuance of the Interim Order, Mr. Lunnen, Grievant, has objected to the
submission of further evidence to this Hearing Officer. See Lunnen Memorandums dated
January 13,1993, and February 3,1993. The Agency submitted its requested documentation
on January 25,1993. Grievant f s main objection is that this Hearing Officer was prohibited
from accepting or requiring further evidence in this case once the hearing day was over.
Pursuant to the above citations, Hearing Officers are given wide latitude in seeking to do
justice to the respective parties. In this specific case, Mr. Lunnen filed a Request For
Reconsideration, which basically stated that the Agency did not meet its burden of proof;
therefore, the supplemental information could not be introduced. What Mr. Lunnen did not
address in his Motion is that the Interim Order issued states emphatically that Mr, Lunnen
was insubordinate, on that issue the Agency fully met its burden.

Therefore, the

supplemental evidence sought, which as noted in the Interim Order that the record would
remain open, was not further testimony or argument but rather proof of consistent
discipline.

The only information sought by the Hearing Officer was, "What is the

appropriate punishment for insubordination at UDOT?*
Mr. Lunnen argues in his Motion For Reconsideration that the Agency did not prove
a demotion was consistent discipline for one act of insubordination. That is true. However,
this does not invalidate thefindingthat Lunnen was, without doubt and by substantial proof,
insubordinate and the only evidence received was that the reduction in grade was what the
Agency thought was just and consistent with prior discipline. Therefore, it was for Lunnen• s
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benefit that further proof of consistency was required. Lunnen further argues, in his second
Memorandum, that this Hearing Officer is barred by the "residuum rule" as stated in the
case of Toknan v. Salt Lake County, which bars "all hearsay and other legally inadmissible
evidence." What Mr. Lunnen is saying is that the Agency' s subsequent submissions are
hearsay and/or legally inadmissible. What the court in Tolman was referring to was due
process. Do the parties have the ability to confront and examine the witnesses against
them? In this case there has been no objection to the evidence introduced and accepted
at the hearing. The subsequent submissions were provided to both parties. No objection
to the materials provided has been made by Mr. Lunnen; he has argued against their being
received, but receipt of these documents has only been to assist in the provision of an
appropriate remedy, not to assist in the determination of guilt or innocence. This specific
bifurcation is allowed by R137-1-20 J.
Does the above rule allow for subsequent information to be received? The Hearing
Officer may provide for 'other relief as deemed appropriate and in the best interest of the
respective parties," through the receipt of information pursuant to R137-1-20 A. so long as
each party' s due process is protected. In this case the parties each had full opportunity to
provide subsequent information dealing with consistent discipline for the behavior found to
be insubordinate and to further contest the information provided.
As an exhibit to his final Memorandum, Mr. Lunnen attached a copy of the Parker
v. Utah Department of Corrections, 5 CSRB 42, (Step 6) issued 28 January 1993. Although
issued after the hearing of the above parties, it does have some clarification useful to this
case. The Parker Order cites R137-1-20 J. at page 5. In its discussion of the rule the Career
Service Review Board states that the determination of whether "discipline as excessive,
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion" is inherent in the process
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of rendering a decision. The Hearing Officer must give latitude and consideration to an
agency's decision when supported factually.
Parker does not state that a case cannot be bifurcated nor evidence received on the
narrow issue of consistency of discipline nor as a basis to give latitude and consideration to
an agency • s discipline. What Parker does say is that whatever method of evidence gathering
is used, when permissible, it must be fair to both parties. In this case, the latitude given to
the Agency, as well as the consistency of imposing demotion, were not adequately addressed
at the hearing by either party; therefore, fairness to both sides dictated further
documentation to the issue. This in no way impinges on the finding that Mr. Lunnen was
insubordinate. The supplemental issue only pertained to his demotion.
The reason for the supplemental information was to be fair and not have the Hearing
Officer ratify a discipline inconsistent with prior Agency imposition with the possibility of
being overly harsh on the Grievant.

DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the information submitted by the Agency pursuant to the Interim Order
and Grievant's failure to contest either the sufficiency or veracity of that information as
well as both the consistency and severity of the Agency • s use of demotion as a discipline
when employees have been insubordinate, it is hereby held that the Agency' s discipline was
neither excessive, disproportionate nor an abuse of discretion. Therefore, Mr. Lunnen's
grievance remedy seeking a lesser discipline is denied and the Agency' s discipline is upheld.
Additionally, Grievant's Motion For Reconsideration, although untimely, has been
considered and discussed above, and is also denied.
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^_«

DATED this /i>

day of March 1993.

Michael N. Martinez
CSRB Hearing Officer

<^7

RECONSIDERATION
Any request for reconsideration muit be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board within ten
working days upon receipt of this decision. (Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-20 M.)
APPEAL
Any appeal of this decision must be filed in writing with the Career Service Review Board within ten working
days upon receipt of this decision. (Utah Cod* Unannotated (1983 Supp.), 567-19a-407(l)(a)(i).)
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BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In The Matter Of:
FINDINGS OF FACT,
JAMES M. LUNNEN,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Grievant,
AND INTERIM ORDER
v.
WITH CONTINUING
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION

JURISDICTION

Agency.

Case No. CSRB/H.0.154

AUTHORITY
In compliance with Utah Code Annotated §67-19a-406, an administrative hearing at
Step 5 was held on Tuesday, November 10,1992. James M. Lunnen (Grievant) was present
and represented by Thomas R. Bielen, Utah Public Employees' Association; the Utah
Department of Transportation (Department) was represented by Grant S. Fairbanks, Human
Resource Manager. A court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceedings; testimony
and documentary evidence were received into the record. Witnesses were placed under
oath. This Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer, Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-2(l)(h)) now
makes and enters the following:
STIPULATED FACTS
The parties, by and through their representatives, stipulated and agreed that the

following facts shall be deemed conclusively admitted as to all parties:
1.

Mr. Lunnen was hired by the Utah Department of Transportation as a

probationary employee, Schedule "B," on March 6, 1978.
2. On September 21, 1985, Grievant was promoted to a Highway Operations
Specialist, Grade 17.
3. On April 1, 1989, Grievant was promoted to a Highway Operations Specialist,
Grade 19.
4. The Job Specification for a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 19, indicates
that the incumbent may be subject to 24 hour call-out.
5. Because of Grievant' s assignment, he received a pager approximately the same
time that he was promoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 19.
6. On April 2,1992, Grievant was called to a meeting. Present at the meeting were:
Mr. Lunnen; Ron Smith, Area Supervisor; Paul Crossland, Supervisor; and Gloria Hunt,
District Administrative Coordinator.
7. On June 22,1992, Grievant was given a warning notice dated June 16,1992, which
indicated a problem with not responding to a call-out.
8. On July 7,1992, a memo was sent to Eugene Findlay, Executive Director of the
Utah Department of Transportation, by Gene Sturzenegger, District 2 Director, requesting
that Grievant be demoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 17, and be given an
11% reduction in salary.
9. On July 13,1992, Mr. Findlay sent a memo to Grievant that informed him that
he would be demoted.

.2-

10. The Grievant appealed this proposed demotion.
11. Mr. Findlay appointed Howard Richardson, Deputy Director, to hear the appeal.
Mr. Richardson was assisted by Lester Jester, Engineer for Maintenance; Heber Vlam,
Engineer for Standards and Special Studies; and Grant Fairbanks, Human Resource
Director.
12. A hearing was held on August 3, 1992, regarding the proposed demotion.
13. As a result of the aforementioned hearing, the Department board recommended
that a demotion from Grade 19 to Grade 17 with a 2.75% reduction in pay be assessed.
14. On August 10,1992, Mr. Findlay sent a memo to Grievant which indicated that
Lunnen would be demoted to a Highway Operations Specialist, Grade 17, effective
August 15, 1992.
15. Mr. Lunnen was demoted to Grade 17 and given a salary reduction to $11.62
effective August 15,1992.
16. Mr. Lunnen appealed this aforementioned demotion to the fifth step of the
grievance process.
17. Joint Exhibit 1, a UDOT Performance Review of Lunnen, for the period 7/1/90
- 6/30/91 evidences an "S/U" rating, which is a cross between •successful" and
"unsuccessful" in the "24-Hour Call" objective.

Paul Crossland wrote of Lunnen:

•Sometime [sic] hard to get a hold of for snow removal at night."
18. Joint Exhibit 2, a UDOT Performance Review of Lunnen, for the period 7/1/91
- 6/30/92, evidences an unsatisfactory rating on the "24«Hour Call" objective. Crossland
wrote of Lunnen that Lunnen "may be" subject to 24 hour call-out. Crossland thanked
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Lunnen for installing a phone in his residence. Testimony relevant to this exhibit stated that
Crossland was reinforcing the 24 hour call-out provision in Lunnen • s job duties. Crossland
also wanted to reinforce the fact that a phone was a requirement of the job.
19. Joint Exhibit 3, a UDOT Warning Notice to Lunnen, dated June 16,1992, and
signed by both Lunnen and Crossland, states that Lunnen did not respond to an emergency
call-out and upon a subsequent attempt to telephonically contact Lunnen, an answering
machine informed the dispatcher that the Lunnens were not at home. The exhibit further
states that a demotion for Lunnen will be recommended to the Executive Director.
20. Joint Exhibit 5, a memorandum from Gene Sturzenegger to Gene Findlay,
UDOT Executive Director, details Lunnen's history regarding 24 hour call-outs and
recommends a demotion.
21. Joint Exhibit 4 is a class specification of the Utah Department of Human
Resource Management (DHRM) for Lunnen's position. The class specification states that
the employee's working conditions:
may be subject to 24 hour call; may be required to have access
to an operating telephone or equivalent method of contact in
case of emergency.
22. Agency Exhibit 1, as testified to by Crossland, is a record of the after hours callouts made to Lunnen and others on his crew between January 1, 1992, and June 21,1992.
The exhibit shows that Lunnen responded to after hour calls 3 of 14 times. This is a 20%
response rate. The next lowest response was 40%, according to Crossland.
23. Based upon the low response to call-outs by Lunnen, Crossland called Lunnen
into a meeting on April 2,1992. Lunnen was informed that disciplinary action would follow
if he did not improve his response to call-outs. Tlu- basis for the needed improvement,
according to Crossland, was that a "no show" placed crew members at risk because they
had to work longer hours to remove snow. That, coupled with bad weather and fatigue
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which they experienced while working longer hours, placed them in danger.
24. Crossland stated that there was no criteria nor policy determinative of what
percentage of call-outs each crew member was required to adhere to.
25. During the eight months Lunnen was without a phone* a pager had been
provided to him. Lunnen and Crossland had a code devised which informed Lunnen if he
should merely call in or or whether he should show up at the station in response to the
page. Lunnen stated that several times he checked the pager and it appeared not to be in
working order. Each report of an inoperable pager was responded to by repairing the pager
by the end of the shift.
26. On June 12, 1992, a tape was made of the call by dispatch to the Lunnen
residence. The tape was played for this hearing officer and is a part of the record, although
not a part of the transcript due to the multiple voices on the tape. The dispatcher called
while Lunnen and a friend were watching a televised basketball game at approximately
10:00 p.m. The dispatcher informed Lunnen that there had been a concrete buckle on
1-215. Lunnen responded "ok". Approximately one-half hour later, a dispatcher again
called the Lunnen residence and a machine answered the phone. Lunnen did not respond
to the emergency.
27. Lunnen and his wife testified that it is common among the crew members to call
each other during televised sporting events and pretend there has been a call-out. Lunnen
and his wife have both participated in these pranks. Lunnen believed the call of June 12,
1992, to be such a prank, but he could not verify it because other pranksters were not
answering their phone when Lunnen tried to call them.
28. It was this failure to respond to the June 12,1992 call-out that led to Lunnen's
demotion.
29. But for the call-out situation at issue, Lunnen was a satisfactory employee who
had been recommended for a promotion from Grade 17 to Grade 19, by Crossland, due to
his ability and hard work. Lunnen has worked at UDOT since 1978 and has no other
disciplinary record.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. State of Utah, DHRM R477-11-2 states that an employee may be demoted for
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cause as listed in R477-10-2 and R47741-1 of the rules,
2. R477-10-2 governs corrective actions. Pursuant to this rule, which governs conduct
other than "willful misconduct," corrective action shall consist of one or more of a number
of actions, pursuant to a written plan.
3, R477-1M governs disciplinary actions. Disciplinary action may be instituted for,
among other reasons, insubordination or disloyalty to the orders of a superior. The type and
severity of the discipline shall be governed by due process as defined in R477-11-1.(1)
through R477-ll-l.(l)(e).
DISCUSSION
Thefirstissue in dispute is whether or not the Agency can demote Lunnen without first
implementing corrective action pursuant to R477-10-2.
In this case there is a history of satisfactory job performance, except in the goal,
"objective*, of 24-hour call-outs. As to that objective, Lunnen has received notice through
two annual evaluations and a meeting on April 12, 1992, that he needed improvement in
that objective. That is, Lunnen needed to show up when he was called out for after-hour
emergency situations.
To assist Lunnen "s meeting the objective, the Agency provided him with a pager when
he could not afford to pay for a phone in his home — a period of eight months. Lunnen *s
supervisor went to Lunnen's house to pick him up on more than one occasion when there
was a heavy snowfall that needed emergency clearing and Lunnen had no phone. This
Hearing Officer believes these pick ups were to assist Lunnen, not to punish or embarrass
him.
The unsatisfactory performance of the 24-hour call-out objective did not impede
Lunnen1 s promotion based upon an overall satisfactory performance. The person who
recommended that Lunnen be promoted was the same person who had issued him a pager,
picked him up, gave him time to install a phone, and evaluated Lunnen annually,
Paul Grassland.
Can a corrective action plan merely consist of only verbal notice to respond to an
objective, or an annual evaluation comment which may or may not be clear to the employee,
or a meeting which informs the employee that there is a problem? In this case, the
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employee was given notice by each of the above means that there was a problem. The
solution was to pick him up when he was needed; then a pager was used to contact him;
then, finally a phone was required to be installed. Each of the above was a means to
remedy a problem. The problem — not being as responsive as management wanted — was
communicated in writing at least twice.
I have discussed the Corrective Action Plan rule because Lunnen made it a key part
of his defense that he was not given a written Corrective Action Plan as called for in the
rule. However, the rule regarding corrective actions is not an exclusive remedy when
"willful misconduct" exists. In this case, demotion resulted due to one incident which
occurred on June 12,1992. The appropriate rule to apply is R477-11-1, Disciplinary Action.
(See Grievant Exhibit 2.) This rule applies in cases of".. .insubordination, disloyalty to the
orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance,

"

In this case, Lunnen received a phone call from the dispatcher informing him of an
emergency situation and that he was requested to respond. Lunnen was at home and
personally received the call. He gave absolutely no indication that he could not or would
not respond to the call. He was watching a basketball game with a friend. Lunnen»s failure
to respond is based upon bis claim that he thought it was a prank call. Grievant and his
wife both testified that they and Grievant • s co-workers call each other during televised
sporting events and, as a prank, act as if they are calling from work and request that the
called party report to work. Lunnen believes this is an intervening event that does exculpate
him. Lunnen did not verify with anyone at work that the call was not legitimate. Lunnen
cannot validate his failure to respond by putting up a defense that is of his own creation.
His non-response is not based upon legitimate grounds, but upon a reason that should not
exist because it has the ability to harm someone or cause someone injury if the result is as
in this case.
Is Lunnen subject to discipline for not responding to a direct order? The appropriate
answer h only if he was insubordinate or disobeyed orders of a superior or was misfeasant
or malfeasant is he then subject to demotion as a discipline, as stated in R477-11-2, which
is based upon and recites Utah Code Annotated (UCA), §67-19-18(1). There is no doubt
Grievant disobeyed the orders of a superior. Disobedience to the orders of a superior is
-7-

insubordination. The aa is also malfeasance and misfeasance in that Lunnen did not do
something he should have done and/or did it wrongfully.. No matter how we characterize
the act, it meets the requirement for discipline.
The severity of the discipline is governed by R477-ll-l.(l). Discipline must take into
consideration: consistency of application, prior knowledge of the standards, notice of
noncompliance, determination of facts and opportunity to respond. Lunnen had prior
knowledge that there was a problem with his not responding to the call-outs. Grievant
received notice by way of annual evaluations, verbal notification and by meetings. Lunnen
has been given the opportunity to respond to the allegation of insubordination. The
remaining issue is whether or not the demotion is consistent with other employees1
disciplinary penalties for insubordination.
The Agency offered one instance of insubordination and a commensurate demotion as
proof of consistency of application.

Taking into account the long and valued work

performance of Lunnen, it does not appear that a demotion for this act is consistent with
prior discipline imposed by the Agency. There is no dispute that Lunnen knew about the
call-out policy of 24-hours and that he knew he was subject to it; but, there is no proof that
it is a mandatory policy nor that anyone else has been disciplined for not responding to the
call-out, except the one incident mentioned above. There is substantial evidence from both
sides that any excuse for not responding was accepted as being valid. In this case, Lunnen
had no excuse.
Pursuant to UCA, §67-19a-406, the Agency has the burden of proof in cases of
demotion. The Agency has not provided any proof that the demotion of Lunnen is
consistent with prior discipline for one act of insubordination. It would be difficult and
probably inequitable to both parties for this Hearing Officer to ratify some random
discipline. Therefore, Lunnen will continue in his present status for twenty working days
from receipt of this decision. During this time, the Agency shall submit the best evidence
they have regarding the discipline they imp< »M<I on others for a similar first insubordination
finding. If there is no consistency in application of discipline, this Hearing Officer will select
the most common or equitable discipline. '!.

\gency should be aware that if demotion

is not a consistent discipline, then Lunnen will be reinstated to his prior grade with back

-8-

pay.
ORDER
This Hearing Officer finds that the Agency had the authority to discipline Lunnen an
that Lunnen was insubordinate by his failure to obey the order of a superior pursuant t
Lunnen • s prior knowledge that he was subject to a 24-hour call-out. The discipline impose
shall be held in abeyance pending proof by the Agency that it is consistent with other
similarly situated employees. The Agency shall submit to this Hearing Officer, through the
Administrator of the Career Service Review Board, its best proof of what discipline is
consistently given to employees of the Agency for a first time insubordination, i.e., failure
to obey the order of a supervisor. This Hearing Officer shall then ratify the Grievant's
appropriate discipline. If there is no consistent discipline, this Hearing Officer shall select
the most appropriate one from those disciplines most regularly imposed. Any adjustment
to Lunnen's grade and pay shall be adjusted when the discipline is imposed.
Pending modification or validation of the discipline, the record shall remain open. This
hearing and its record shall remain open for purposes of appeal by Grievant until the
discipline is imposed and the time for appeal shall commence subsequent to a modification
of this Order which imposes the discipline. Copies of all submittals to this Hearing Officer
shall be provided to GricvanV
»a 4 1 UM
DATED this _£__ day of-Deccmbcr, 1992.
Michael N. Martinez
<Zs~
Hearing Officer/Presiding Officer
Career Service Review Board
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BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In The Matter Of:
CHARLES D. KENT,

DECISION ON MOTION

Grievant,

TO REOPEN HEARING

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Agency.

Case No. 10 CSRB/H.0.138

The Department has made a Motion to Reopen the above-entitled hearing dated
February 20,1992, citing the following two points:
1.

Grievant testified falsely that he kept management informed of his case, when
in fact he did not; and

Grievant fs testimony that he kept management informed of his case was a
surprise to the department
Grievant has responded with an Opposition to the Motion to Reopen, dated March 6,
2.

1992, by citing the following three points:
1.

The Department's Request to Reopen the hearing is a disguised attempt to
Request a Re-hearing and the Motion should therefore be denied.

2.

The record has been closed in this matter and the Hearing Officer does not
have authority to grant the Motion requested by the Department.

3.

Whether or not Grievant had discussions with Mr. Kimber is only relevant if
the Hearing Officer determines the Department had formally adopted a policy
concerning Professional Standards.
The Department has responded in a Reply, dated March 11, 1992, raising the
following two points:

1.

The Department does not seek a Re-hearing of this case.

2.

The Hearing Officer has the Authority to re-open the record for the purpose
of taking additional evidence.

Rule R140-1-20 E of the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Manual of the Career
Service Review Board of the State of Utah states:
Closing of the Record After all testimony, documentary
evidence, and arguments have been presented, the hearing
officer shall close the record and terminate the proceeding,
unless one or both parties agree to submit a posthearing brief
within a specified time.
The above-referenced rule sets forth the duty of the hearing officer to close the
record in the course of conducting a Step 5 hearing for the Career Service Review Board.
The authority and other duties and matters are also set forth in various sub-sections of
R140-1-20. In the Motion at hand, the Department is requesting the Hearing Officer to reopen this hearing to allow an additional witness to testify and be cross-examined. While the
Hearing Officer is very sensitive to the argument of "complete surprise" made by the
Department about the testimony of the Grievant given at the hearing, it appears that the
argument could have been made more appropriately at the hearing itself where "all
testimony, documentary evidence, and arguments" were supposed to have been made.
R140-1-20 E. does not make provisions for allowing arguments or evidence to be
entered after the hearing has been formally closed. Because of the silence of the rule on
this matter, this Hearing Officer concludes that the drafters of the rule did not contemplate
that arguments or evidence or additional testimony would be allowed to be entered after
the hearing had been formally closed.
The Rule does allow for the record to be kept open if both parties agree to submit
a posthearing brief, but that is not the case here.
R140-1-20 M. makes provision for a reconsideration of a Step 5 decision by saying
that, 'The written request h to contain specific reasons as to why a reconsideration is
warranted with respect to the factualfindingsand conclusions of the" decision. This rule
do^s contemplate the use of a reconsideration procedure and does make specific provisions
about how it is to occur.
By making a very strict interpretation of R140-1-20 E. the Hearing Officer concludes
that it would be an abuse of discretion to re-open a hearing for additional evidence,
testimony or documents, once it has been formally closed, because no specific provisions are

DECISION
Based upon the foregoing, the Departments Motion is hereby respectfully denied.
DATED this "frl** day of

"lj\(xAA^

1992.

Sherri R. Guyon
CSRB Hearing Officer

*

Utah Code Annotated 67-19a-406(2)(a) (1953, as amended).

(2)(a)

The agency has the burden of proof in all

grievances resulting from dismissals, demotions, suspensions,
written reprimands, reductions in force, and disputes concerning
abandonment of position.

Utah Administrative Code R137-1-20C.

Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing.

An evidentiary/step 5

hearing shall be a new hearing for the record, held de novo, with
both parties being granted full administrative process as
follows:
(1)

The CSRB hearing officer shall first make factual

findings based solely on the evidence presented at the hearing
without deference to any prior factual findings of the agency.
The CSRB hearing officer shall then determine whether:

(a)

the

factual findings made from the evidentiary/step 5 hearing support
with substantial evidence the allegations made by the agency or
the appointing authority, and (b)

the agency has correctly

applied relevant policies, rules and statutes.
(2)

When the CSRB hearing officer determines in

accordance with the procedures set forth above that the
evidentiary/step 5 factual findings support the allegations of
the agency or the appointing authority, then the CSRB hearing
officer must determine whether the agency's decision, including
any disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive disproportionate
or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion.

In making this

latter determination, the CSRB hearing officer shall give
deference to the decision of the agency or the appointing
authority unless the agency's penalty is determined to be

excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an abuse of discretion
in which instance the CSRB hearing officer shall determine the
appropriate remedy.

Utah Administrative Code R137-1-20E.

E.

Closing of the Record.

After all testimony,

documentary evidence, and arguments have been presented, the
hearing officer shall close the record and terminate the
proceeding, unless one or both parties agree to submit a
posthearing brief within a specified time.

Utah Administrative Code R137-1-20G.

G.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law.

Following the

closing of the record, the hearing officer shall make and enter a
written decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of
law.

The decision and order is filed with the administrator and

without further action becomes the decision and order of the
evidentiary hearing.

Utah Administrative Code R477-11-1.

Disciplinary Action.

Noncompliance with these rules,

departmental or other applicable policies and safety policies,
professional standards adopted by a department, work place
policies, and such matters as inefficiency, incompetency, failure
to maintain skills, adequate performance levels, insubordination,
disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance,
nonfeasance or failure to advance the good of the career service
shall be cause for disciplinary action.

For purposes of R477-11,

employee shall mean career service employee unless indicated
otherwise.
11-1.(1)

The type and severity of any disciplinary

action taken shall be governed by principles of due process which
include:
(l)(a)

Consistent application

(l)(b)

Prior knowledge of rules and standards

(l)(c)

Determination of fact

(l)(d)

Timely notice of noncompliance

(l)(e)

Opportunity to respond and rebut as

defined herein.
11-1.(2)

If the agency determines that a career

service employee is charged with aggravated or repetitive
misconduct or that the retention of a career service employee

would endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave
threat to the public interest, the agency, pending an
investigation to determine fact upon which disciplinary action
may be taken, shall utilize one or more of the following options:
(2)(a)

The employee may be placed on paid

administrative leave (suspension with pay).
(2)(b)

The employee may be temporarily reassigned

to another position or different work location at the same rate
of pay pending the completion of the investigation.
11-1.(3)

In all cases, except as provided under

Section 67-19-18(4) the disciplinary process includes the
following:
(3)(a)

The agency representative notifies the

employee in writing of the proposed discipline and the reasons
therefor;
(3)(b)

The employee has five working days within

which to reply and have the reply considered by the agency
representative before discipline is imposed.
(3)(c)

If an employee waives the right to respond

or does not reply within the time frames stated in these rules or
as established by the agency representative, whichever is longer,
discipline may still be imposed in accordance with these rules.
(3)(d)

The employee and the agency representative

may agree in writing to waive or extend any grievance step, or

the time limits specified for any grievance step.
11-1.(4) After an employee has been informed of the
reasons for the proposed discipline and has been given an
opportunity to respond and be responded to, discipline may be
imposed by the agency representative as appropriate.

In

determining the specific type and severity of the discipline to
be taken, consideration may be given to such factors as the
severity of the infraction, the repeated nature of violations,
prior disciplinary/corrective actions, previous oral warnings,
written warnings and discussions, the employee's past work
record, the effect on agency operations, and the potential of the
violations for causing damage to persons or property.
Disciplinary action may include one or more of the following
options:
(4)(a) Written reprimand.
(4)(b)

Suspension of the employee without pay up

to 30 calendar days per occurrence requiring discipline.
(4)(c)

Demotion of the employee utilizing one of

the following methods as provided by law:
(1) An employee may be moved from a position
in one class to a position in another class having a lower
entrance salary if the duties of the position
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